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Abstract	  Philosophers	  of	  music	  commonly	  distinguish	  performative	  from	  critical	  interpretations.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  critical	  and	  performative	  interpretations	  is	  well	  captured	  by	  an	  analogy	  to	  legal	  critics	  and	  judges.	  This	  parallel	  draws	  attention	  to	  several	  features	  of	  performative	  interpretation	  that	  are	  typically	  overlooked,	  and	  deemphasizes	  epistemic	  problems	  with	  performative	  interpretations	  that	  I	  believe	  are	  typically	  blown	  out	  of	  proportion	  and	  ultimately	  fail	  to	  capture	  interesting	  features	  of	  performative	  interpretation.	  There	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  to	  be	  made	  between	  critical	  and	  performative	  interpretation,	  but	  its	  source	  lies	  in	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  authority	  of	  critical	  and	  performative	  interpretations.	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I.	  	  Philosophers	  of	  music	  commonly	  distinguish	  performative	  from	  critical	  interpretations.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  critical	  and	  performative	  interpretations	  is	  well	  captured	  by	  an	  analogy	  to	  legal	  critics	  and	  judges.	  This	  parallel	  draws	  attention	  to	  several	  features	  of	  performative	  interpretation	  that	  are	  typically	  overlooked,	  and	  deemphasizes	  epistemic	  problems	  with	  performative	  interpretations	  that	  I	  believe	  are	  typically	  blown	  out	  of	  proportion	  and	  ultimately	  fail	  to	  capture	  interesting	  features	  of	  performative	  interpretation.	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  central	  problem	  with	  the	  debate	  over	  performative	  interpretation	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  an	  overly	  narrow	  set	  of	  properties	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  identifying	  them.	  This	  is	  brought	  out	  sharply	  by	  Jerrold	  Levinson’s	  use	  of	  an	  argument	  from	  indiscernibility	  in	  his	  influential	  essay	  on	  performative	  and	  critical	  interpretation.	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  showing	  that	  performances	  with	  indiscernible	  sound	  structures	  do	  not	  necessarily	  indicate	  identical	  performative	  interpretations.	  A	  great	  number	  of	  performance	  choices	  that	  do	  not	  affect	  sound	  structure	  can	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  performative	  interpretation.	  These	  extra-­‐sonic	  properties	  of	  performative	  interpretations,	  combined	  with	  the	  sonic	  properties,	  can	  give	  us	  much	  more	  robust	  and	  critical	  interpretations	  that	  are	  usually	  acknowledged	  by	  those	  advocating	  for	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  the	  types	  of	  interpretation.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  distinction	  is	  irrelevant	  or	  uninteresting,	  however.	  There	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  to	  be	  made	  between	  critical	  and	  performative	  interpretation,	  but	  its	  source	  lies	  in	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  authority	  of	  critical	  and	  performative	  interpretations.	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  “performative”	  and	  “critical”	  interpretation	  is	  explicitly	  addressed	  by	  Richard	  Wollheim	  in	  his	  seminal	  Art	  and	  its	  Objects	  [Wollheim	  (1980)],	  Wollheim	  takes	  the	  relatively	  commonsense	  position	  that	  a	  performative	  interpretation	  was	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  performer’s	  critical	  interpretation	  of	  a	  work.	  That	  is,	  there	  is	  a	  basic	  correspondence	  between	  performative	  and	  critical	  interpretations.	  The	  commonsense	  position	  has	  been	  assailed	  from	  two,	  ultimately	  similar,	  positions.	  The	  first	  position	  argues	  that	  performers	  do	  not	  really	  interpret	  at	  all	  since	  performances	  are	  not	  representations	  or	  are	  not	  assertoric	  [Dickie	  (1992)].1	  The	  second	  position	  allows	  that	  performers	  interpret,	  but	  argues	  that	  their	  interpretations	  are	  essentially	  different	  from,	  and	  so	  logically	  independent	  of,	  critical	  interpretations.	  I	  will	  focus	  my	  attention	  on	  this	  second	  position	  which	  has	  been	  defended	  by	  Jerrold	  Levinson	  [Levinson	  (1996)]	  and	  largely	  taken	  up	  by	  Robert	  Stecker	  [Stecker	  (2003)].	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  relationship	  between	  performative	  interpretations	  and	  critical	  interpretations	  has	  been	  hampered	  by	  an	  overly	  narrow	  conception	  of	  the	  performance	  choices	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  performative	  interpretation.	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  I	  show	  that	  even	  sonically	  indiscernible	  performances	  might	  be	  expressions	  of	  different	  performative	  interpretations.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  clear	  in	  Levinson’s	  influential	  article	  “Performative	  versus	  Critical	  Interpretation	  in	  Music”	  [Levinson	  (1996)]	  in	  which	  he	  argues	  for	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  critical	  and	  performative	  interpretations.	  In	  illustrating	  this	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  Levinson	  reveals	  an	  unreasonably	  narrow	  conception	  of	  the	  “facts	  of	  performance”	  that	  has	  been	  largely	  accepted	  without	  comment,	  and	  that	  serves	  to	  make	  his	  account	  far	  leaner	  than	  is	  justified.	  I	  argue	  that	  too	  sharp	  of	  a	  separation	  between	  performative	  and	  critical	  interpretations	  leads	  to	  an	  untenable	  view	  of	  performance	  practice.	  Levinson	  relies	  on	  the	  following	  example	  of	  indiscernible	  performances:	  	  Consider…two	  conductors	  whose	  recorded	  performances	  of	  a	  given	  symphony	  sound	  virtually	  identical,	  allowances	  made,	  perhaps,	  for	  different	  orchestral	  venues—that	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  appear	  to	  have	  made	  all	  the	  same	  performing	  choices.	  Would	  we	  not	  hold	  these	  conductors	  to	  have	  offered	  the	  same	  PI	  of	  the	  piece,	  whatever	  else	  we	  might	  know	  or	  learn	  about	  the	  backgrounds	  of	  the	  performances?	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  seems	  clearly	  yes,	  and	  shows	  that	  a	  PI,	  as	  normally	  understood,	  does	  not	  include	  the	  discursive	  thoughts	  or	  analytical	  insights	  that	  may	  have	  occasioned	  it,	  or	  that	  it	  may	  occasion	  [Levinson	  (1996),	  p.	  69].	  	  This	  example	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  performance,	  the	  “performing	  choices,”	  that	  Levinson	  allows	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  determining	  a	  critical	  interpretation	  are	  very	  limited	  indeed.	  For	  his	  view,	  a	  performative	  interpretation	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  intentionally	  produced	  sound	  structure	  into	  which	  the	  performer	  has	  put	  some	  thought.	  	  	  
II	  	  Let	  us	  consider	  a	  few	  other	  descriptions	  of	  events	  containing	  identical	  performative	  interpretations	  –	  events	  in	  which	  the	  performers	  have	  made	  all	  the	  same	  performing	  choices	  –	  according	  to	  Levinson’s	  criteria.	  	  	  1.	  Orchestra	  X	  performs	  Bach	  only	  with	  near	  contemporaries	  (“early	  music”	  is	  often	  marketed	  in	  just	  this	  way),	  and	  that	  Orchestra	  Y,	  though	  producing	  the	  same	  sound	  structure	  as	  Orchestra	  X,	  always	  performs	  his	  work	  with	  romantic	  and	  modern	  composers	  profoundly	  affected	  by	  him.	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  Two	  conductors’	  orchestras	  produce	  the	  same	  sound	  structure	  when	  playing	  Shostakovitch’s	  Fifth	  Symphony	  –	  one	  an	  unimaginative	  Soviet	  nationalist	  for	  a	  politburo	  audience,	  the	  other	  a	  Soviet	  dissident	  for	  the	  same	  politburo	  audience.	  	  	  3.	  A	  made-­‐for-­‐CD	  performance	  of	  Haydn’s	  Farewell	  Symphony	  and	  a	  live	  performance	  with	  the	  same	  sound	  structure,	  but	  in	  which	  the	  performers	  blow	  out	  candles	  illuminating	  their	  stands	  one	  by	  one	  before	  leaving	  the	  stage	  during	  the	  last	  movement.	  4.	  A	  contemporary	  conductor’s	  performance	  of	  Orff’s	  Carmina	  Burana	  (or	  
Meistersinger)	  in	  Israel	  and	  one	  with	  an	  identical	  sound	  structure	  performed	  by	  a	  conductor	  sympathetic	  with	  National	  Socialism	  at	  a	  Nuremburg	  rally	  in	  1939.	  	  	  Do	  we	  really	  want	  to	  say	  that	  these	  are	  all	  cases	  of	  virtually	  identical	  performative	  interpretations?	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  seems	  clearly	  no.	  There	  are	  facts	  that	  I	  could	  discover	  that	  would	  make	  me	  say	  that,	  though	  two	  performative	  interpretations	  in	  each	  case	  sounded	  alike,	  they	  actually	  differed	  in	  relevant	  respects.	  Each	  example	  picks	  out	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  a	  neglected	  type	  of	  fact	  when	  considering	  performative	  interpretations.	  The	  first	  example	  highlights	  program	  choice,	  the	  second	  the	  intentions	  and	  certain	  characteristics	  of	  the	  performer,	  the	  third	  chosen	  visual	  aspects	  of	  performance,	  the	  fourth	  general	  performance	  context.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  each	  of	  these	  facts	  of	  performance	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  performative	  interpretation,	  and	  can	  serve	  (though	  need	  not	  necessarily	  serve)	  partially	  to	  constitute	  a	  performative	  interpretation.	  In	  each	  of	  the	  examples	  what	  Peter	  Kivy	  [Kivy	  (1996)]	  calls	  a	  “plausible	  story”	  can	  be	  told	  connecting	  a	  given	  performance	  fact	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	  performative	  interpretation.	  I	  will	  briefly	  consider	  each,	  in	  order	  of	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  descending	  degrees	  of	  controversy.	  The	  general	  background	  context	  of	  a	  performance	  of	  Wagner	  or	  Orff	  seems	  to	  matter	  rather	  greatly	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  performative	  interpretation.	  If	  the	  sound	  structure	  of	  Daniel	  Barenboim’s	  performance	  of	  Tristan	  und	  Isolde	  at	  the	  Israel	  Festival	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2001,	  which	  I	  discuss	  in	  much	  more	  detail	  elsewhere,2	  were	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  one	  produced	  by	  a	  conductor	  sympathetic	  with	  the	  Nazis	  at	  a	  birthday	  party	  of	  Hitler,	  I	  would	  not	  hesitate	  to	  call	  them	  different	  performative	  interpretations.	  Perhaps	  a	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  since	  it	  better	  isolates	  context,	  would	  be	  if	  Barenboim	  produced	  the	  same	  sound	  structure	  in	  Orchestra	  Hall	  in	  Chicago	  with	  the	  Chicago	  Symphony	  as	  he	  produced	  in	  Israel	  with	  the	  Berlin	  Staatskapelle,	  the	  facts	  of	  performance	  are	  sufficiently	  different	  to	  at	  least	  put	  the	  burden	  on	  us	  to	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  the	  same	  performative	  interpretation.	  That	  is,	  the	  reasons	  for	  identifying	  the	  two	  performances	  reach	  beyond	  mere	  sound	  structure	  and	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  what	  Levinson	  would	  consider	  to	  be	  critical	  interpretation.	  It	  matters	  that	  the	  work	  was	  performed	  in	  Israel.	  It	  matters	  that	  it	  was	  performed	  by	  a	  German	  orchestra.	  It	  even	  matters	  that	  it	  sounds	  the	  same	  as	  it	  does	  in	  Berlin.	  The	  combination	  of	  just	  these	  factors	  distinguishes	  the	  performative	  interpretation	  from	  one	  in	  Berlin	  (or	  Chicago,	  or	  Peoria).	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ironic	  Shostakovich,	  the	  dissident’s	  critical	  interpretation,	  background,	  and	  intentions	  are	  sufficient	  to	  make	  a	  different	  performative	  interpretation	  because	  he	  ironically	  uses	  the	  same	  techniques	  that	  the	  loyal	  nationalist	  Soviet	  does	  unironically.3	  It	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  Shostakovich	  is	  different	  and	  raises	  unique	  difficulties	  because	  of	  the	  special	  characteristics	  of	  irony	  and	  parody.	  But	  if	  we	  want	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  parodic	  and	  ironic	  performance,	  then	  we	  have	  to	  abandon	  the	  reduction	  of	  performative	  interpretations	  to	  sound	  structure.	  Peter	  Kivy	  has	  argued	  convincingly	  that	  visual	  characteristics	  of	  a	  performance	  are	  aesthetically	  relevant	  [Kivy	  (1996)].	  For	  example,	  blowing	  out	  the	  candles	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Haydn’s	  Farewell	  Symphony	  is	  aesthetically	  relevant	  and	  does	  serve	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  a	  sonically	  identical	  performance.	  The	  performance	  space	  may	  also	  make	  a	  musical	  impact,	  an	  aesthetic	  impact.	  Imagine	  that	  two	  conductors	  produce	  the	  same	  sound	  structure	  when	  performing	  Bach	  masses,	  but	  one	  always	  performs	  in	  concert	  halls	  while	  the	  other	  performs	  only	  in	  spartanly	  appointed	  Lutheran	  churches.	  These	  performance	  choices	  matter	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  performances,	  are	  taken	  to	  matter	  by	  a	  number	  of	  performers	  and	  their	  audiences,	  and	  so	  matter	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  performative	  interpretation.	  The	  venue	  choice	  or	  the	  choice	  of	  other	  visually	  significant	  features	  of	  the	  performance	  often	  makes	  a	  statement	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  a	  work	  is	  being	  performed	  –	  religious,	  pious,	  autonomous	  and	  aesthetic,	  historically	  and	  culturally	  significant,	  premodern,	  protomodern,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Finally,	  it	  is	  most	  surprising	  that	  program	  choice	  is	  so	  seldom	  mentioned	  as	  a	  relevant	  fact	  of	  performative	  interpretation.	  It	  indisputably	  an	  important	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  choice	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  entire	  performance,	  as	  anyone	  who	  has	  given	  a	  recital	  would	  attest.	  It	  can	  be	  further	  used,	  and	  often	  is	  used,	  to	  illustrate	  various	  connections	  between,	  and	  even	  within,	  pieces.	  A	  number	  of	  performances	  in	  Miller	  Theatre	  in	  New	  York	  City	  in	  recent	  years	  have	  been	  specifically	  programmed	  to	  show	  the	  connections	  between	  contemporary	  composers	  and	  canonical	  ones	  –	  and	  sometimes	  the	  connections	  are	  somewhat	  surprising	  and	  make	  one	  hear	  the	  music	  quite	  differently.	  Once	  concert	  in	  particular,	  by	  pianist	  Alan	  Feinberg	  was	  entitled	  “Reconsidering	  Haydn.”	  Feinberg	  anchored	  the	  program	  with	  Haydn’s	  work	  by	  opening	  with	  his	  piano	  Sonatas	  number	  30	  and	  33.	  He	  then	  moved	  on	  to	  Judith	  Weir,	  
The	  Art	  of	  Touching	  the	  Keyboard,	  Schubert’s	  Impromptu	  in	  G	  Flat	  Major,	  ending	  with	  Mauricio	  Kagel’s	  An	  Tasten.	  The	  mere	  act	  of	  putting	  these	  five	  apparently	  disparate	  pieces	  together	  in	  the	  same	  program	  encouraged	  both	  audience	  and	  performer	  to	  draw	  connections	  between	  them	  all.	  Christopher	  Hogwood	  has	  recently	  been	  performing	  neo-­‐classical	  and	  neo-­‐baroque	  composers	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  along	  with	  composers	  of	  the	  17th	  and	  18th	  centuries	  with	  the	  announced	  intention	  of	  drawing	  these	  historical	  eras	  closer	  together	  musically.	  All	  of	  these	  performance	  choices	  constitute	  performative	  interpretations	  that	  contribute	  to	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  nontrivial	  and	  even	  robust	  critical	  interpretations.	  One	  might	  think	  that	  if	  we	  accept	  what	  I	  have	  just	  argued,	  then	  the	  positionis	  susceptible	  to	  the	  following	  sort	  of	  “anything	  goes”	  worry:	  Joe	  copies	  Yo	  Yo	  Ma’s	  interpretation	  of	  Bach’s	  cello	  suites	  in	  every	  detail.	  He	  also	  comes	  up	  with	  a	  brilliant	  though	  controversial	  critical	  interpretation	  of	  the	  suites	  that	  Ma	  has	  publicly	  ridiculed,	  though	  Joe	  takes	  it	  to	  justify	  the	  performative	  interpretation	  he	  gives.	  Though	  there	  is	  nothing	  new	  about	  his	  sound,	  and	  his	  performance	  sound	  structure	  is	  indistinguishable	  from	  Ma’s,	  I	  seem	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  argue	  that	  he	  has	  a	  different	  performative	  interpretation	  because	  of	  his	  fascinating	  critical	  interpretation.	  (Note	  that	  this	  roughly	  follows	  part	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Shostakovitch	  Fifth	  symphony	  example	  in	  2.	  above.)	  	  I	  would	  respond	  that,	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  sound	  simply	  matters	  more	  than	  critical	  interpretation,	  and	  I	  would	  happily	  call	  the	  performative	  interpretation	  the	  same	  as	  Ma’s.	  But	  why	  is	  this	  justified?	  Just	  as	  Peter	  Kivy	  has	  argued	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  relevance	  of	  visual	  facts	  of	  a	  performance,	  so	  it	  is	  for	  the	  various	  facts	  of	  performance	  I	  have	  outlined	  here	  including	  the	  critical	  interpretation	  of	  the	  performer.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  conceptual	  identification	  and	  definition,	  but	  one	  of	  judgment	  to	  be	  argued	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis.	  I	  readily	  admit	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  a	  brilliant	  critical	  interpretation	  on	  its	  own	  will	  make	  up	  for	  a	  derivative	  sound	  structure	  such	  that	  the	  performative	  interpretation	  associated	  with	  it	  is	  not	  derisively	  and	  correctly	  accused	  of	  being	  the	  same	  as	  another.	  It	  is	  inappropriate	  to	  set	  out	  criteria	  of	  relevance	  in	  advance	  –	  rather	  it	  depends	  whether	  one	  can	  tell	  a	  “plausible	  story”	  connecting	  the	  performance	  fact	  to	  a	  performative	  interpretation	  [Kivy	  (1996)].	  	  Each	  of	  these	  performances	  could	  count	  as	  the	  same	  performative	  interpretation	  only	  if	  the	  facts	  of	  performance	  relevant	  to	  picking	  out	  performance	  choices	  are	  radically	  limited.	  Levinson	  suggests	  that	  his	  restricted	  notion	  is	  how	  performative	  interpretation	  is	  “normally	  understood.”	  But	  is	  this	  a	  normal	  understanding?	  One	  might	  justify	  this	  restricted	  version	  of	  “normal”	  in	  two	  different	  ways.	  First,	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  a	  musical	  performance,	  as	  such,	  is	  normally	  nothing	  more	  than	  object	  for	  aesthetic	  appreciation.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  more	  concept-­‐dependent	  elements	  of	  the	  event	  taken	  more	  broadly	  –	  political	  elements	  of	  Barenboim’s	  performance	  at	  the	  Israel	  Festival,	  for	  example	  –	  might	  be	  ruled	  out	  as	  extra-­‐aesthetic,	  and	  so	  as	  something	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  performative	  interpretation.4	  This	  manner	  of	  limiting	  the	  relevant	  elements	  of	  performance	  simply	  pushes	  the	  problem	  back	  one	  step.	  It	  is	  compelling	  only	  on	  a	  restricted	  view	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  that	  itself	  needs	  an	  argument.	  The	  argument	  for	  such	  an	  austere	  conception	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  is	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  make	  at	  this	  point	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  –	  after	  Nietzsche,	  Adorno,	  Dewey,	  Danto,	  Bourdieu,	  Margolis,	  Goehr,	  Rancière,	  among	  many	  others	  representing	  a	  variety	  of	  philosophical	  methodologies	  –	  than	  one	  limiting	  musically	  relevant	  object	  of	  attention	  to	  the	  sounding	  work.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  an	  argument	  could	  not	  be	  made,	  of	  course.	  It	  is	  simply	  to	  point	  out	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  contextualized	  account	  of	  performative	  interpretation	  I	  give	  here	  should	  cannot	  simply	  assume	  a	  deeply	  contested	  conception	  of	  the	  aesthetic.	  Moreover,	  many	  of	  the	  arguments	  I	  give	  here	  would	  apply,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  to	  austere	  conceptions	  of	  the	  aesthetic.	  While	  to	  fully	  defend	  a	  richer	  account	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  in	  full	  detail	  reaches	  far	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  onus	  is	  on	  the	  defender	  of	  the	  austere	  conception	  of	  aesthetics.	  Another,	  more	  modest,	  way	  to	  give	  a	  narrow	  account	  of	  “normal	  performance”	  compatible	  with	  the	  austere	  version	  of	  performative	  interpretation	  is	  to	  limit	  the	  facts	  of	  all	  performances	  to	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  we	  get	  in	  an	  ideally	  sanitized	  recording	  of	  a	  performance.	  If	  this	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  central	  case	  of	  reception	  for	  performative	  interpretation,	  then	  something	  like	  Levinson’s	  view	  might	  look	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  in	  this	  case,	  however,	  more	  of	  an	  argument	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  stripping	  away	  or	  excluding	  facts	  not	  included	  in	  the	  mere	  sound	  structure	  produced.	  People	  often	  buy	  recordings	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  performers	  and	  performances,	  gain	  more	  knowledge	  about	  them	  by	  reading	  liner	  notes,	  reviews,	  blogs,	  and	  so	  forth.	  Nevertheless,	  as	  recordings	  have	  become	  more	  highly	  engineered,	  sound	  structure	  has	  become	  increasingly	  important	  and	  the	  “facts	  of	  performance”	  as	  presented	  on	  disc	  have	  been	  increasingly	  homogenized.	  It	  does	  seem,	  then,	  that	  Levinson’s	  normality	  claim	  has	  some	  purchase	  in	  the	  rarefied	  realm	  of	  modern	  digital	  recording.	  However,	  even	  if	  we	  grant	  that	  we	  would	  call	  two	  relevantly	  similar	  recordings	  identical	  performative	  interpretations	  no	  matter	  what	  other	  facts	  we	  discovered	  about	  them,	  the	  inference	  from	  this	  to	  a	  claim	  about	  all	  performative	  interpretations	  is	  certainly	  unwarranted.	  Where	  part	  of	  the	  point	  of	  modern	  digital	  recordings	  is	  to	  isolate	  the	  sound	  structure	  and	  present	  it	  in	  as	  pure	  a	  manner	  as	  possible,	  and	  one	  has	  to	  make	  an	  effort	  to	  discover	  the	  other	  facts	  of	  performance,	  the	  facts	  of	  a	  live	  performance	  are	  ineliminable	  –	  or	  at	  least	  one	  needs	  to	  make	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  block	  them	  out.	  Though	  sound	  structure	  is	  obviously	  a	  necessary	  and	  even	  central	  criterion	  for	  the	  identity	  of	  performative	  interpretations,	  it	  cannot	  be	  a	  sufficient	  condition.	  At	  this	  point,	  it	  might	  be	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  my	  account	  simply	  denies	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  performative	  and	  critical	  interpretation.	  But	  there	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  some	  distinction	  that	  one	  would	  want	  to	  maintain	  between	  the	  two.	  In	  the	  space	  remaining,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  one	  source	  of	  the	  distinction	  that	  would	  change	  the	  character	  of	  the	  debate	  of	  the	  role	  of	  performers	  in	  music	  practice	  and	  musical	  understanding	  for	  the	  better.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  performer's	  contribution	  to	  musical	  understanding	  and	  a	  critical	  contribution	  to	  musical	  understanding	  lies	  in	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  performer	  and	  critic.	  	  	  	  	  
III	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  critical	  and	  performative	  interpretation	  is	  usefully	  illuminated	  by	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  the	  historical	  role	  of	  the	  critic	  in	  art	  practice	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  critic	  in	  art	  and	  music	  is	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  joined	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Both	  Jürgen	  Habermas	  and	  Thomas	  Crow	  have	  described	  the	  critical	  influence	  that	  the	  heterogeneously	  populated	  parterre	  of	  18th	  century	  theatre	  had	  on	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  particular	  performances	  as	  well	  as	  works	  [Habermas	  (1991),	  Crow	  (1985)].	  The	  same	  was	  true	  of	  music	  in	  the	  Paris	  Opera,	  according	  to	  James	  Johnson	  [Johnson	  (1995)].	  There	  was	  an	  ever-­‐strengthening	  tendency	  to	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  true	  listeners—those	  who	  were	  moved	  by	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  music	  itself	  –	  and	  those	  who	  were	  merely	  moved	  by	  cheap	  tricks	  or	  their	  own	  internal,	  private,	  reveries.	  Crow	  illustrated	  most	  clearly	  that,	  in	  the	  18th	  century	  Salons,	  there	  was	  a	  persistent	  fear	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Academie	  that	  the	  criticisms	  of	  a	  parterre-­‐like	  public,	  that	  is	  one	  dominated	  by	  the	  rowdy	  and	  unreflective,	  would	  come	  to	  control	  the	  content	  of	  the	  exhibitions.	  Contemporary	  characterizations	  of	  the	  public	  contained	  both	  negative	  elements,	  describing	  the	  mass-­‐like	  features	  of	  the	  crowds	  in	  the	  Salons,	  as	  well	  as	  positive	  elements	  describing	  the	  surprisingly	  refined	  judgments	  emerging	  from	  varied	  perspectives	  (from	  the	  sensitive	  fishmonger,	  or	  the	  keen-­‐eyed	  baker).	  A	  key	  to	  stabilizing	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  public,	  and	  to	  preserving	  the	  practice	  of	  producing	  artworks,	  was	  a	  core	  of	  reasonable	  attention	  to	  the	  work	  itself	  (the	  autonomous	  work	  of	  art)	  represented	  by	  well-­‐founded	  critical	  interpretations.	  	  In	  the	  artistic	  public	  sphere	  whose	  core	  norm	  was	  autonomy	  (autonomy	  of	  aesthetic	  appreciation,	  autonomy	  of	  judgment,	  and	  autonomy	  of	  works)5	  the	  justification	  for	  an	  interpretation’s	  being	  well-­‐founded	  lay	  in	  its	  being	  grounded	  in	  the	  work	  itself	  rather	  than	  in	  any	  particular	  and	  arbitrary	  interest.	  This	  began	  as	  a	  negative	  critique	  of	  works	  that	  served	  the	  interests	  of	  residual	  feudal	  political	  and	  religious	  powers.	  But	  another	  danger	  opened	  on	  the	  side	  of	  reception	  the	  expansion	  of	  an	  ever	  more	  heterogeneous	  audience	  which	  raised	  the	  specter	  of	  interpretive	  chaos	  and	  philistinism.	  It	  is	  no	  coincidence,	  then,	  that	  professional	  art	  criticism	  arose	  simultaneously	  with	  the	  literary	  public	  sphere.	  At	  the	  outset,	  criticism	  was	  dominated	  by	  amateurs	  presumably	  because	  the	  sphere	  of	  influence	  of	  the	  artistic	  public	  was	  still	  fairly	  small	  and	  homogeneous.	  As	  the	  literary	  public	  expanded	  with	  regard	  both	  to	  demographics	  and	  types	  and	  numbers	  of	  works	  presented,	  it	  ran	  into	  conflicts	  similar	  to	  those	  encountered	  by	  the	  political	  public	  sphere.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  autonomous	  work	  demanded	  critical	  interpreters	  that	  wouldn’t	  be	  carried	  away	  by	  their	  own	  merely	  contingent	  preferences,	  and	  who	  would	  not	  be	  unduly	  influenced	  by	  expressions	  of	  the	  mass’s	  interests.	  These	  demands	  of	  the	  autonomous	  work	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  generally	  expected	  to	  be	  met	  by	  a	  heterogeneous	  audience	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  had	  lost	  its	  expectation	  of	  solidarity	  generated	  by	  a	  shared	  religion,	  shared	  social	  status,	  and	  shared	  education.	  Just	  as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  political	  public	  sphere,	  so	  it	  was	  in	  the	  literary	  public	  sphere:	  to	  preserve	  the	  public,	  the	  public	  needed	  to	  be	  divided	  into	  expert	  and	  lay	  audience.	  Habermas	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  through	  this	  institution	  of	  professional	  criticism,	  that	  “lay	  judgment	  of	  a	  public	  that	  had	  come	  of	  age,	  or	  at	  least	  thought	  it	  had,	  became	  organized”	  [Habermas	  (1991),	  p.	  41].	  The	  art	  critic	  was	  to	  be	  both	  educator	  and	  spokesperson	  for	  this	  public.	  German	  musicologist	  Carl	  Dahlhaus	  suggests	  that,	  	  	  In	  the	  period	  of	  aesthetics	  [around	  1800],	  the	  critic	  appears,	  at	  least	  ideally,	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  public;	  he	  becomes	  its	  preceptor	  only	  when	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  ideal	  and	  the	  empirical	  audience,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  volunté	  de	  tous	  and	  the	  volunté	  générale,	  has	  become	  too	  acute	  [Dahlhaus	  (1983),	  p.	  12].	  	  Dahlhaus’s	  allusion	  to	  Rousseau	  here	  is	  especially	  rich	  and	  leads	  us	  by	  an	  unexpected	  route	  back	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  critical	  and	  performative	  interpretations.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  general	  will	  (volunté	  générale)	  and	  the	  will	  of	  all	  (volunté	  de	  tous)	  is	  that	  the	  former	  is	  the	  public	  will	  while	  the	  latter	  is	  merely	  an	  expression	  of	  private	  wills.	  Government	  fails	  and	  descends	  into	  tyranny	  when	  it	  expresses	  merely	  a	  private	  will	  (whether	  of	  the	  individual	  government	  actor,	  or	  of	  some	  aggregate	  of	  the	  people).	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  general	  will	  needs	  to	  be	  protected	  from	  the	  government.	  In	  cases	  where	  the	  will	  of	  all	  usurps	  the	  power	  of	  the	  general	  will,	  the	  latter	  needs	  to	  be	  protected	  from	  (the	  mere	  private	  aggregate	  of)	  the	  people.	  It	  is	  in	  just	  these	  situations	  that	  Rousseau	  believes	  the	  intervention	  of	  a	  tribunate	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  democracy.	  The	  tribunate	  is	  a	  judicial	  body	  with	  the	  power	  of	  interpreting	  the	  law,	  which	  is	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  general	  will,	  and	  mediates	  between	  the	  people	  and	  the	  government.	  In	  Rousseau’s	  words,	  the	  tribunate	  “is	  the	  preserver	  of	  the	  laws	  and	  the	  legislative	  power.	  It	  serves	  sometimes	  to	  protect	  the	  sovereign	  against	  the	  government…;	  sometimes	  to	  sustain	  the	  government	  against	  the	  people…;	  and	  sometimes	  to	  maintain	  equilibrium	  between	  the	  two”	  [Rousseau	  1987,	  p.	  215].	  In	  every	  case,	  the	  tribunate	  issues	  an	  authoritative	  expression	  of	  the	  sovereign	  power	  (the	  general	  will)—even	  against	  the	  people.	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  suggestion	  that	  the	  critic	  mediates	  between	  the	  general	  will	  and	  the	  will	  is	  suggestive,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  quite	  to	  the	  point.	  Critics	  can	  give	  an	  account	  of	  what	  the	  music	  ought	  to	  express,	  and	  they	  can	  give	  an	  account	  of	  what	  the	  people	  ought	  to	  listen	  for.	  They	  can	  even	  point	  out	  where	  the	  general	  will	  and	  the	  will	  of	  all	  come	  apart.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  musical	  tastes,	  this	  might	  involve	  pointing	  out	  the	  admirable	  and	  worthy	  characteristics	  of	  underappreciated	  music.	  It	  might	  involve	  criticizing	  performers	  for	  performing	  underappreciated	  music	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  prevents	  appreciation.	  It	  might	  involve	  criticizing	  audiences	  for	  being	  taken	  in	  by	  unworthy	  music.	  Eduard	  Hanslick’s	  influential	  music	  criticism	  in	  late	  19th	  Century	  Vienna	  did	  all	  of	  these	  things,	  and	  many	  critics	  continue	  to	  do	  the	  same	  today	  [Hanslick	  (1988)].	  In	  every	  case,	  though,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  critic	  is	  continuous	  with	  that	  of	  an	  active	  audience	  member	  who	  enters	  into	  discussion	  with	  her	  family	  and	  friends	  about	  what	  is	  worth	  listening	  to,	  or	  what	  was	  good,	  bad,	  interesting,	  or	  indifferent	  about	  a	  performance	  or	  a	  work.	  Critics	  differ	  quantitatively	  with	  audience	  members,	  but	  not	  qualitatively.	  That	  is,	  critics	  have	  a	  larger	  audience,	  and	  they	  have,	  on	  the	  whole,	  more	  experience	  and	  more	  musical	  background	  than	  typical	  members	  of	  the	  musical	  public	  sphere.	  The	  authority	  critics	  have,	  here,	  is	  the	  authority	  of	  an	  expert,	  or	  more	  experienced	  friend	  offering	  advice	  rather	  than	  
mandating	  how	  the	  music	  is	  heard.6	  Critics	  are	  limited	  in	  this	  crucial	  respect,	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  critic	  as	  influential	  as	  Hanslick.	  They	  cannot	  give	  practical	  authoritative	  expression	  to	  music.	  More	  specifically,	  they	  cannot	  give	  an	  authoritative	  expression	  of	  a	  particular	  work.	  Critics	  do	  not	  play	  the	  kind	  of	  role	  in	  music	  performance	  practice	  to	  determine	  how	  musical	  works	  will	  go	  analogous	  to	  judges’	  power	  to	  decide	  how	  the	  law	  will	  go	  in	  particular	  cases.	  Critics	  cannot	  preserve	  the	  law	  or	  the	  musical	  work,	  either	  for	  or	  against	  the	  people,	  though	  they	  can	  make	  an	  argument	  to	  the	  people	  and	  performers	  about	  how	  it	  ought	  to	  go.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  critics	  cannot	  be	  enormously	  influential	  as	  advice-­‐givers	  and	  educators.	  They	  can	  have	  and	  historically	  have	  had	  enormous	  influence	  on	  how	  artworks	  are	  viewed	  and	  understood,	  of	  course.	  But	  having	  influence	  or	  offering	  advice	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  issuing	  an	  authoritative	  decision	  concerning	  how	  the	  laws	  are	  to	  be	  preserved	  and	  developed.	  The	  distinction	  is	  analogous	  to	  that	  between	  a	  legal	  commentator	  and	  a	  judge.	  As	  influential	  as	  the	  former	  may	  be,	  only	  decisions	  of	  the	  latter	  are	  authoritative	  and	  give	  expression	  to	  the	  law.	  Only	  judges	  make	  law	  and	  obligate	  the	  audience	  in	  the	  very	  act	  of	  interpretation.	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  as	  members	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  legal	  critics	  and,	  I	  am	  arguing,	  music	  critics	  claim	  to	  know	  of	  no	  authority	  other	  than	  that	  of	  the	  better	  argument.	  After	  the	  “great	  divide”	  of	  modernity,	  the	  role	  of	  critics	  became	  one	  granted	  and	  played	  by	  the	  public	  –	  criticism	  was	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  fallible	  and	  taken	  to	  be	  “good	  till	  countermanded”	  by	  further,	  better	  reasons.	  Though	  critical	  practice	  has,	  of	  course,	  become	  organized	  and	  institutionalized,	  it	  is	  all	  merely	  well-­‐informed	  lay	  judgment	  and	  so	  has	  the	  character	  of	  one	  voice	  among	  others	  in	  public	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  guiding	  discourse.	  Habermas	  is	  correct	  to	  note	  that	  “[t]his	  was	  precisely	  where	  the	  art	  critic	  differed	  from	  the	  judge”	  [Habermas	  (1991),	  p.	  41].Although	  the	  critic	  may	  be	  more	  knowledgeable	  and	  more	  experienced	  than	  lay	  members	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  those	  members	  were	  not	  to	  be	  “obligated	  by	  any	  judgment	  but	  their	  own”	  [Ibid.].	  Again,	  the	  difference	  here	  between	  lay	  members	  of	  the	  audience	  and	  critics	  is	  a	  quantitative	  one,	  not	  a	  qualitative	  one.	  The	  intellectual	  authority	  gained	  by	  critics	  after	  the	  great	  divide	  was,	  in	  principle,	  just	  the	  same	  as	  the	  authority	  gained	  by	  the	  audience.	  The	  lay	  member	  of	  the	  audience	  could	  in	  principle	  argue	  on	  the	  same	  ground	  as	  the	  critic	  and	  come	  to	  reject	  any	  critic’s	  judgment.	  It	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  culture	  of	  critics	  makes	  it	  seem	  as	  if	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  in	  kind	  between	  expert	  and	  lay	  reception	  and	  criticism.	  It	  may	  even	  seem	  as	  if	  critics,	  especially	  influential	  critics,	  lay	  down	  the	  law	  with	  regard	  to	  particular	  works.	  Even	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  expert	  critics	  set	  the	  tone	  of	  how	  works	  are	  received,	  critical	  interpretations	  are	  immediately	  critically	  defeasible	  in	  a	  way	  judicial	  decisions	  are	  not.	  In	  the	  end,	  a	  critic	  is	  just	  one	  public	  voice	  among	  others.	  	  The	  performer,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  not	  merely	  one	  voice	  among	  others.	  The	  performer	  has	  direct	  control	  over	  how	  the	  work	  sounds,	  and	  so	  how	  an	  audience	  is	  to	  hear	  it	  in	  a	  particular	  context.	  That	  a	  musical	  performer	  is	  authoritative,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  sense,	  should	  neither	  be	  controversial	  nor	  surprising.	  It	  is	  common	  to	  speak	  of	  musical	  performance	  as	  authoritative	  in	  two	  senses.	  First,	  performers	  are	  often	  invested	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  metaphorical	  authority.	  Performers	  are	  taught	  to	  take	  
command	  of	  a	  work	  and	  of	  their	  audience,	  and	  to	  show	  this	  command	  in	  their	  playing.	  In	  master	  classes,	  the	  virtuoso	  violinist	  Isaac	  Stern	  told	  his	  students	  to	  carry	  themselves	  and	  to	  play	  as	  if	  to	  say,	  “I	  am	  here.	  Shut	  up	  and	  listen.”	  The	  history	  of	  virtuoso	  performers,	  criticism	  of	  their	  playing,	  and	  accounts	  of	  their	  lives,	  is	  rife	  with	  metaphors	  of	  authority.	  Violinists	  of	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  were	  regularly	  described	  as	  “Alexander	  of	  the	  violin”	  or	  “Caesar	  of	  the	  violin.”	  Musicologist	  Mai	  Kawabata	  writes	  of	  one	  violinist,	  Alexander	  Boucher	  who,	  taking	  
Critical Performances                                                                                    13 full	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  of	  his	  physical	  resemblance	  to	  Napoleon,	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  dress	  as	  the	  general	  for	  his	  concerts,	  striking	  various	  Napoleonic	  poses	  before	  and	  after	  performing.	  Kawabata	  goes	  on	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  how	  certain	  “heroic	  codes”	  affected	  a	  variety	  of	  elements	  of	  music	  performance	  practice	  –	  composition,	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  bow,	  instrument,	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  soloist	  and	  orchestra,	  the	  soloist	  and	  the	  audience,	  and	  so	  on	  [Kawabata	  (2004)].	  More	  important	  than	  these	  metaphors	  of	  authority,	  however,	  are	  several	  elements	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  performances	  that	  point	  to	  a	  more	  literal	  authority	  of	  the	  performer.	  That	  is,	  the	  performer	  presents	  the	  audience	  with	  a	  musical	  directive	  to	  hear	  works	  in	  particular	  ways.	  Roger	  Scruton	  argues	  that	  we	  “put	  ourselves	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  music”	  when	  we	  listen,	  that	  we	  are	  “led	  by	  it	  through	  a	  series	  of	  gestures	  whose	  significance	  lies	  in	  their	  intimation	  of	  community”	  [Boghossian	  (2003),	  p.	  54].	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  works	  are	  presented,	  not	  only	  the	  particular	  “sensuous	  realization”	  of	  “way	  of	  sounding	  it”	  as	  Levinson	  would	  have	  it,	  but	  all	  of	  the	  performance	  choices	  mentioned	  above,	  are	  not	  under	  the	  audiences	  direct	  control.7	  Nor	  should	  it	  be.	  The	  performer	  chooses	  what	  music	  to	  play	  and	  how	  to	  play	  it.	  The	  audience	  is	  to	  sit	  silently,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  and	  is	  to	  follow	  along.	  They	  are	  asked	  to	  follow	  the	  musical	  lines	  that	  the	  performer	  draws	  connecting	  and	  distinguishing	  various	  parts	  internal	  to	  the	  work,	  they	  are	  asked	  to	  follow	  the	  connections	  between	  works.	  Elements	  of	  the	  music,	  and	  the	  correct	  way	  of	  following	  them,	  are	  brought	  out	  in	  any	  number	  of	  ways	  –	  through	  dynamic	  and	  timbral	  variance,	  through	  physical	  gestures	  of	  the	  conductor	  or	  of	  different	  players.	  Sometimes	  they	  are	  even	  asked	  to	  follow	  connections	  between	  elements	  in	  the	  “world	  of	  the	  music”	  and	  elements	  in	  the	  “world	  of	  the	  world”	  [Kivy	  (1997),	  p.	  207]	  (Barenboim	  performing	  Wagner	  in	  Israel	  is	  just	  one	  particularly	  striking	  example).	  That	  is,	  when	  one	  listens	  to	  a	  performative	  interpretation,	  one	  follows	  its	  movement.8	  There	  is	  no	  room	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  dissent	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  audience	  within	  the	  norms	  of	  concert-­‐going	  –	  the	  audience	  cannot	  simply	  choose	  to	  hear	  another	  interpretation.	  They	  cannot	  directly	  affect	  the	  interpretation	  presented	  to	  them	  within	  the	  conventions	  of	  classical	  music	  performance	  practice.	  Whether	  or	  not	  audience	  members	  agree,	  they	  are	  obligated	  to	  listen	  to	  and	  follow	  the	  particular	  shape	  the	  performer	  gives	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  music.	  Whether	  or	  not	  audience	  members	  agree	  with	  any	  particular	  interpretive	  choices,	  each	  performance	  becomes	  a	  fact	  of	  musical	  life	  with	  which	  they	  must	  engage.	  Audience	  members	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  disrupt	  the	  performance	  by	  foot	  shuffling,	  coughing	  deliberately,	  groaning,	  singing,	  booing,	  throwing	  things,	  getting	  up	  and	  leaving.	  Disruptions	  like	  these	  are	  common	  enough	  to	  situate	  them	  within	  the	  conventions	  of	  performance,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  conventional	  behavior.	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  characterize	  these	  examples	  of	  disruption	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  musico-­‐civil	  disobedience.	  Of	  course,	  this	  characterization	  of	  such	  behavior	  highlights	  the	  authority	  that	  is	  being	  resisted,	  rather	  than	  denying	  it.	  While	  it	  would	  be	  revealing	  to	  explore	  examples	  of	  disturbance	  to	  explore	  the	  nature	  of	  audience	  obligation,	  the	  sanctions	  of	  resisting	  the	  performers’	  authority,	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  this	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  It	  is	  enough	  here	  to	  notice	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  audience’s	  direct	  intervention	  on	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  musical	  work	  and	  the	  performer’s.	  One	  might	  say,	  following	  through	  on	  the	  analogy	  to	  the	  tribunate,	  that	  the	  performer's	  interpretation	  becomes	  law	  for	  the	  audience.	  Of	  course	  performers’	  authority	  over	  a	  work	  is	  not	  absolute,	  however	  assertive	  their	  claim	  might	  be	  in	  the	  concert	  hall.	  Any	  given	  night’s	  performance	  will,	  in	  all	  likelihood,	  not	  be	  the	  final	  performance	  of	  this	  particular	  work.	  Though	  it	  may	  be	  deemed	  “definitive”	  by	  zealous	  critics,	  none	  of	  these	  critics	  would,	  as	  a	  result,	  recommend	  that	  every	  future	  performer	  perform	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  or	  recommend	  that	  listeners	  stop	  attending	  performances.	  Nor	  would	  such	  effusive	  critics	  recommend	  that	  performers	  stop	  performing	  the	  work.	  This	  is	  simply	  not	  the	  nature	  of	  modern	  performance	  practice.	  Audience	  members	  do	  not	  go	  to	  a	  concert	  definitively	  to	  settle,	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  questions	  about	  a	  work,	  but	  to	  listen	  to	  a	  particular	  account	  of	  it.	  That	  the	  deliberation	  of	  the	  musical	  public	  sphere	  does	  not	  end	  with	  a	  single	  performance	  changes	  the	  performance	  from	  a	  mere	  authoritarian	  assertion	  of	  how	  a	  work	  is,	  to	  an	  authoritative	  contribution	  to	  an	  ongoing	  debate	  about	  how	  the	  work	  should	  be.	  In	  short,	  even	  though	  performers	  are	  authoritative	  in	  the	  concert	  hall,	  we	  must	  never	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  a	  critical	  public	  for	  whom	  they	  perform.	  Even	  though	  performers	  are	  responsible	  to	  a	  critical	  public,	  we	  must	  never	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  also	  authoritative.	  	  	  	  
IV	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  performer	  and	  the	  critical	  participation	  of	  the	  audience	  in	  the	  shaping	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  work	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  to	  go,	  and	  indeed	  how	  the	  practice	  as	  a	  whole	  ought	  to	  go,	  that	  makes	  the	  relationship	  between	  performative	  and	  critical	  interpretation	  so	  productive	  in	  practice	  and	  so	  philosophically	  interesting.	  It	  points	  directly	  to	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  debate	  –	  namely,	  the	  question	  of	  which	  agents	  directly	  involved	  in	  musical	  practice	  have	  control	  over	  the	  unfolding	  of	  musical	  practice,	  and	  how	  that	  control	  can	  be	  exercised.	  Characterizing	  the	  debate	  in	  this	  way	  raises	  difficult	  questions	  in	  practical	  and	  political	  philosophy:	  whether	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  performer	  is	  compatible	  with,	  a	  function	  of,	  or	  in	  conflict	  with,	  the	  reflective	  participation	  of	  the	  audience;	  whether,	  or	  what	  kind	  of,	  participation	  of	  the	  audience	  has	  value;	  what	  are	  the	  sanctions	  of	  defying	  the	  norms	  of	  the	  to	  what	  extent,	  under	  what	  conditions,	  and	  toward	  what	  end	  (musical-­‐)	  civil	  disobedience	  might	  be	  justified	  within	  performance	  practice.	  While	  a	  full	  justification	  of	  the	  participatory	  and	  deliberative	  conception	  of	  musical	  performance	  practice	  that	  my	  characterization	  here	  has	  suggested	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper,	  the	  framework	  I	  have	  provided	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  positions.9	  Far	  from	  being	  merely	  allowing	  us	  to	  accommodate	  counterexamples,	  the	  characterizing	  the	  relationship	  between	  performative	  and	  critical	  interpretation	  in	  terms	  of	  authority	  forces	  us	  to	  notice	  that	  the	  context	  of	  performance	  is	  an	  intersubjective	  one	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  reasons.	  While	  acknowledging	  the	  performer’s	  authority	  in	  performance,	  my	  account	  of	  performative	  interpretation	  also	  brings	  to	  the	  fore	  performer’s	  broader	  role	  in	  critical	  public	  deliberation	  about	  music.	  This	  has	  two	  effects	  on	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  performers.	  First,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  performative	  interpretation	  is	  broadened.	  The	  narrow	  view	  of	  performative	  interpretation	  and	  performance	  insured	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  any	  given	  performance,	  and	  performances	  in	  general,	  would	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  case	  at	  hand.	  Performances	  were	  cut	  off	  from	  playing	  a	  normative,	  argumentative	  role	  beyond	  the	  sounding	  in	  the	  concert	  hall.	  Again,	  it	  is	  as	  though	  a	  judge	  issued	  a	  ruling	  (for	  the	  appellant,	  say)	  without	  a	  reasoned	  decision,	  leaving	  the	  audience	  the	  impossible	  task	  of	  filling	  out	  a	  larger	  justification.	  	  Second,	  my	  account	  of	  the	  relevant	  facts	  of	  performance	  and	  performative	  interpretation	  brings	  the	  nature	  of	  performers’	  authority	  more	  in	  line	  with	  a	  modern	  conception	  of	  publicness.	  A	  position	  that	  leaves	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  performer	  intact,	  but	  conceptually	  cuts	  off	  a	  deliberative	  role	  for	  both	  the	  audience	  and	  performer,	  threatens	  to	  allow	  a	  form	  of	  premodern	  publicness	  to	  creep	  back	  into	  performance	  practice.	  On	  such	  a	  view,	  a	  performance	  is	  characterized	  as	  a	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  non-­‐transparent	  presentation	  of	  the	  way	  the	  work	  goes.	  Not	  only	  could	  we	  find	  no	  reasons	  if	  we	  searched,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  conceptual	  mistake	  even	  to	  make	  the	  attempt.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  such	  a	  performative	  interpretation	  might	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  
more	  authoritative	  than	  a	  modern	  public	  performative	  interpretation.	  The	  audience	  is	  to	  follow	  along,	  and	  not	  to	  question,	  the	  performer’s	  decision	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  absolute.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  authoritative	  decision	  has	  such	  a	  narrow	  scope,	  affecting	  only	  the	  present	  audience	  without	  critically	  engaging	  it,	  that	  its	  authority	  quickly	  melts	  away	  with	  the	  last	  echo	  of	  applause.	  This	  modern	  yet	  disengaged	  authority	  might	  then	  be	  taken	  to	  render	  the	  performer	  impotent.	  To	  conclude,	  I	  want	  to	  point	  to	  one	  significant	  possibilities	  opened	  up	  by	  this	  account	  of	  performative	  interpretation.	  When	  performative	  interpretation	  is	  characterized	  as	  intentionally	  produced	  sound	  structure	  into	  which	  the	  performer	  has	  put	  some	  thought,	  the	  performer,	  while	  performing,	  is	  conceptually	  robbed	  of	  a	  critical	  or	  reflective	  role	  in	  musical	  practice.	  Understanding	  performative	  interpretation	  in	  terms	  of	  authority	  and	  participation	  clears	  the	  way	  for	  an	  account	  of	  critical	  performances	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  understanding	  not	  only	  of	  individual	  musical	  works,	  but	  of	  music	  practice	  as	  whole.	  Performers	  and	  performances	  play	  a	  central	  role	  such	  diverse	  activities	  as	  showing	  how	  a	  work	  should	  go,	  drawing	  connections	  between	  various	  works,	  criticizing	  performance	  practices,	  or	  even	  setting	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  musical	  public	  itself.	  This,	  I	  believe,	  promises	  to	  give	  us	  more	  insight	  into	  the	  active	  and	  varied	  roles	  that	  performers	  and	  critics	  play	  in	  the	  modern	  musical	  public	  sphere.	  10	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  Notes	  	  1	  On	  performance,	  he	  writes,	  “Of	  course,	  we	  speak	  of	  a	  musician’s	  particular	  way	  of	  playing	  a	  piece	  as	  an	  interpretation,	  but	  this	  is	  something	  entirely	  different	  and	  not	  a	  declaration	  of	  meaning”	  [Dickie	  (1992),	  p.	  112].	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2	  Neufeld	  (2009).	  3	  This	  is	  true	  for	  both	  the	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  aspects	  of	  the	  question.	  The	  CI,	  background,	  and	  intentions	  are	  sufficient	  to	  differentiate	  the	  two	  performances.	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  audience	  can	  or	  would	  tell	  the	  difference	  is	  an	  empirical	  question.	  But,	  conductors	  lead	  such	  public	  lives	  whose	  rough	  CIs	  and	  backgrounds	  are	  generally	  accessible,	  at	  least	  to	  the	  extent	  necessary	  to	  distinguish	  an	  ironic	  from	  a	  non-­‐ironic	  performance	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Shostakovich.	  	  4	  I	  thank	  the	  blind	  reviewer	  at	  Teorema	  for	  raising	  this	  point.	  5	  These	  three	  interlocking	  conceptions	  of	  autonomy	  are	  enumerated	  by	  Jay	  Bernstein	  in	  Bernstein	  (1995),	  pp.	  161-­‐62.	  6	  For	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  authority	  of	  giving	  advice	  and	  authority	  of	  a	  command,	  see	  Raz	  (1983).	  	  7	  And	  it	  is,	  in	  general,	  better	  that	  they	  are	  not.	  The	  conception	  of	  authority	  I	  am	  tracing	  here	  has	  affinities	  with	  Joseph	  Raz’s	  “service	  conception”	  of	  authority,	  recently	  summarized	  and	  revised	  in	  Raz	  (2006).	  8	  This	  claim	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  a	  venerable	  tradition	  in	  music	  that	  includes	  Rousseau	  himself.	  He	  claims	  in	  the	  “Letter	  on	  French	  Music”	  that	  when	  the	  listener	  “[gives]	  his	  soul	  over	  to	  impressions	  of	  music.”	  [Rousseau	  (2009)].	  9	  I	  defend	  the	  value	  of	  a	  deliberative	  democratic	  conception	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  performer,	  work,	  and	  audience	  in	  Music	  in	  Public:	  How	  Performance	  Shapes	  
Democracy	  (under	  contract;	  Oxford	  University	  Press)	  10	  I	  have	  greatly	  benefited	  from	  discussions	  on	  earlier	  drafts	  of	  this	  paper	  with	  Lydia	  Goehr,	  Brian	  Soucek,	  Tiger	  Roholt,	  Hanne	  Appelqvist,	  Gregg	  Horowitz,	  William	  Day,	  the	  Columbia	  University	  Aesthetics	  Reading	  Group,	  and	  the	  audience	  of	  the	  American	  Philosophical	  Association’s	  Pacific	  Division	  meeting.	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